Background: Basic self-disturbance (BSD) is proposed to constitute the clinical core of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including prodromal states and schizotypy. Anomalous self-experiences (ASEs) are suggested as phenotypic variants of BSD, representing markers of schizophrenia vulnerability. However, ASEs are not restricted to the schizophrenia spectrum, but may also occur in non-psychotic states like depersonalization disorder (DPD). It is unclear to what extent the prevalence and nature of ASEs are differing between the two conditions. The main aim of this paper is to assess and compare ASEs in both conditions, based on literature and two illustrating cases. This might expand the understanding of these phenomena, and strengthen the basis for clinical differentiation. Methods: One patient with schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) and one with DPD were selected from an ongoing clinical high-risk (CHR) for psychosis study. ASEs were assessed with the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) and analyzed according to the two central dimensions of BSD: diminished self-affection and hyperreflexivity, as well as according to prototypical aspects of depersonalization. The cases were also analyzed and compared with respect to chronology, other symptomatology, and psychopathological pathways. Results: Both cases revealed ASEs reflecting the central dimensions of BSD as well as prototypical aspects of depersonalization. Only the SPD case however, linked ASEs to psychotic-like ideas of external influence and control. The symptoms had an insidious early childhood onset with no obvious triggers in the SPD case, and an abrupt adolescence onset triggered by second-time cannabis use and panic anxiety in the DPD case. Conclusions: The similarities and differences in ASEs, symptomatology and developmental pathways of the two cases might be accounted for by an updated model of self-disorders. The model proposes that schizophrenia manifests as a result of a combination of early "primary"-onset ASEs, reflecting disturbances in early neurodevelopment, and later occurring, "secondary" ASEs of a more defensive-protective character. In line with this, the DPD case may be characterized only by secondary ASEs and thus better protected against psychotic decompensation than the SPD case, tentatively affected by a combination of primary and secondary ASEs.
Introduction
Phenomenologically oriented researchers have proposed that a disturbance in the basic sense of self lies at the core of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSDs) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] and also mark the prodrome of these conditions [6, 7] . Sass and Parnas [2] hypothesized that this basic self-disturbance (BSD) (also termed self-disorder, ipseity disturbance, or disturbance in the "minimal self" [1, 2, 8] ) constitutes a driving force with respect to the development of positive, negative, and disorganized psychotic symptoms. Two intimately connected phenomena characterize BSD. The first is "diminished self-affection", referring to a diminished sense of basic self-presence, i.e. existing as a vital subject of awareness or agent of action (accordingly also termed "diminished self-presence" in recent publications [9, 10] ). The second is "hyperreflexivity", which refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness and heightened awareness of normally tacit or implicit aspects of experience. These phenomena are commonly accompanied by a disturbed "grip" or "hold" on the cognitive-perceptual world, feelings of existential perplexity, an inadequate grasp of everyday, self-evident meanings ("common sense disturbances"), and disturbed self-other/self-world boundaries [2, 3] . BSD commonly manifests as a composite of various anomalous self-experiences (ASEs) [2, 11] .
The BSD model is inspired and informed by a large body of classical phenomenological-psychiatric literature [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , and the model has achieved substantial empirical support during the last two decades. In 2005, a scale -the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) -was published targeting BSD phenomena [17] . Self-disorders have been found to be specific to schizophrenia compared to other psychotic disorders, and they aggregate in schizotypy and prodromal schizophrenia [4, 11, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . They are also prominent in non-psychotic family members of SSD patients and in CHR for psychosis conditions, and they predict SSDs in CHR and in nonpsychotic conditions [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Consequently, ASEs are increasingly considered as strong phenotypic markers of schizophrenia vulnerability, and the identification of ASEs has been suggested as a close-in strategy for identifying subjects with the highest risk for psychosis, particularly with respect to SSDs [25, 30] .
However, the specificity of ASEs is not a fully settled matter. ASEs include depersonalization and derealization phenomena, which may also occur outside of the schizophrenia spectrum. These phenomena are commonly described as feelings of unreality and detachment with respect to the self (depersonalization) and the outside world (derealization). Symptoms may occur briefly or prolonged, in the general population, in various mental disorders (e.g., panic disorder or depression), in medical or neurological conditions, or associated with drug use and medication [31] . Longstanding conditions, with these phenomena as the dominant symptoms, are diagnosed as depersonalization disorder (DPD) in DSM-IV, grouped among the dissociative disorders [32] . The most typical triggers of chronic depersonalization (DPD) are drug use, severe stress, anxiety disorders, and depression [31, 33] . However, in many subjects, no immediate triggers are identified. A sudden onset has been found in 40-50% of the cases, while other cases are more commonly characterized by a gradual, insidious onset [33, 34] . DPD generally starts in adolescence or young adulthood [31] . A link with experiences of emotional abuse during childhood has been demonstrated, but not with sexual trauma or physical abuse [35] .
Looking at recent research and attempts at understanding and conceptualizing DPD, it is evident that the symptomatology of this disorder is not restricted to feelings of unreality and detachment. Several studies indicate that the depersonalized condition is characterized by a number of distinct symptoms [33, 34, 36, 37] . These symptoms constitute a clinical composite, termed the depersonalization syndrome, which is suggested to include: (1) feelings of disembodiment (lack of body ownership and/or agency feelings), (2) emotional numbing (disturbed ability to imbue perceived objects or concrete situations with emotional feeling), (3) anomalous subjective recall ([a] "factual" aspect of memory is preserved but unsure if the event really happened and [b] disturbances in the capacity for imagery), and (4) derealization (detachment, feeling cutoff from the world, things seem unreal) [38] .
According to Schneider [40] and Klosterkötter [16] , alienation phenomena in non-psychotic disorders are different than the depersonalization phenomena found in schizophrenia, the first being characterized by only "quantitative" reductions in the sense of self, comprising feelings of obscurity, remoteness, and unreality. In line with this conceptualization, and referring to Sass and Parnas' BSD model, Bürgy [39] asserts that disturbances in the sense of mineness of experience constitute a core syndrome in the schizophrenia spectrum not present in DPD. A categorical distinction between DPD and SSD is reflected in current diagnostic manuals [32, 41, 42] . However, the description of prototypical symptoms in DPD does include several aspects of disturbances in the Anomalous Self-Experiences in the Schizophrenia Spectrum and DPD sense of mineness of experience, as described with respect to feelings of disembodiment, although not including frank first-rank symptoms [37, 38] . Such similarities seem to question a clear distinction between SSD and other mental disorders, including DPD, as made by Schneider [40] , Klosterkötter [16] , Bürgy [39] , and proponents of the BSD model [30] .
The main aim of this study thus was to explore and compare ASEs in "mild" schizophrenia spectrum conditions, i.e., schizotypy, and in DPD. This is of importance to expand the understanding of these phenomena across diagnostic boundaries and to strengthen the basis for clinical differentiation, particularly with respect to schizophrenia vulnerability. Meaningful relations between symptoms, and the complex relations between symptoms and pathogenic factors, may be best captured and described at an explorative level through case studies [43] . Consequently, we did a phenomenological investigation and comparison of two patients, one with schizotypal personality disorder (SPD) and the other with DPD, who both fulfilled CHR criteria for psychosis.
Methods
The SPD and the DPD case were purposefully selected from an ongoing prospective CHR study to highlight the topic of the present paper. The CHR study takes place at the Early Intervention in Psychosis Advisory Unit for South East Norway, Oslo University Hospital (TIPS Sør-Øst) and is a part of the TOP study at the NOR-MENT KG Jebsen Center for Psychosis Research, Oslo University Hospital. This study has been approved by the Regional Committee for Research Ethics (REK Sør-Øst).
In the CHR study, the CHR status was established according to ultra high-risk criteria, assessed with the Structured Interview of Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS) [44] and basic symptom highrisk criteria: the High-Risk criterion Cognitive Disturbances (COGDIS), outlined in the Schizophrenia Proneness Scale -Adult Version (SPI-A) [45] . Both cases revealed attenuated positive symptoms and deficits in functioning, but they did not completely fulfill ultra high-risk criteria, as these symptoms and deficits had not started or worsened the last year. However, both fulfilled COGDIS criteria, revealing subjectively experienced thought disturbances.
Diagnoses were established according to DSM-IV [46] , including assessment with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV axis I disorders (SCID-I). In addition to SPD (assessed as part of the SIPS), the SPD case was also diagnosed with a remitting depressive disorder and specific phobia (animal type). The DPD case also fulfilled criteria for panic disorder with agoraphobia in remission, but the enduring depersonalized condition had prevailed in the absence of anxiety symptoms. Her reality testing abilities were intact (fulfilling the DPD criterion), which is not incompatible with fulfilling CHR criteria [47, 48] . [17] .
The EASE has been shown to possess very good/excellent internal consistency [22, 49] and interrater reliability [49] . The items were scored according to the continuous 0-4 severity scale, and later converted into and presented as dichotomous scores (1 = definitely present, 0 = absent or questionably present).
Based on these assessments, the two patients were selected as illustrating cases. Due to the phenomenological overlap between symptoms in DPD and SPD, the formal diagnostic differences between these two cases are shortly summarized here. As to SPD criteria in DSM-IV, only the SPD case fulfilled the general diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder. He also fulfilled more than the required five specific criteria for SPD, including distortions in cognition, perceptual experiences, affect, behavior, and interpersonal functioning (criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). In the DPD case, the abrupt onset was better explained as symptoms of an axis I disorder (panic attack, followed by DPD) than a DSM personality disorder. However, she displayed symptoms fitting with some of the specific criteria in DSM-IV for SPD (criteria 3 and 6, possibly criterion 2), as well as similar-sounding criteria for schizotypal disorder in ICD-10 [41] . With respect to the DPD diagnosis, both cases demonstrated prototypical symptoms (criterion A), which were distressing and impacted on functioning (criterion C). However, unlike the DPD case, these symptoms were better explained as part of another mental disorder (SPD) in the SPD case (not fulfilling criterion D). Reality testing (criterion B) was also more compromised, although not fully lacking, in the SPD case [32] .
The EASE interviews were videotaped, viewed several times, and discussed with one of the authors of the EASE (P.M.). The descriptions of ASEs from the two cases were scrutinized, analyzed, and categorized according to the EASE manual. Based on this first analysis, descriptions of ASEs were again analyzed and this time categorized as examples of one of the two dimensions of BSD: diminished self-affection and hyperreflexivity [2, 30] , as well as the four symptom groups constituting the depersonalization syndrome [38] . This second analysis was done on an ad hoc theoretical basis, comparing verbatim statements from the two cases with paradigmatic descriptions of the core dimensions of BSD and the prototypical depersonalization syndrome symptom groups [2, 38, 50] . The descriptions and categorization of ASEs in the two cases were then compared with each other, item by item. Verbatim statements were selected to illustrate similarities and differences between both cases. A few additional statements from the SIPS interviews were also included.
The cases were also analyzed and compared with respect to chronology, other symptoms, and psychopathological pathways. Information regarding background and medical history was collected from medical journals and through semistructured interviews with the patients. The accounts of the background, medical history, life situation, and symptoms of both cases were anonymized. Both patients signed a written consent approving the publishing of these accounts in a peer-reviewed scientific paper. All interviews and primary analyses of the interviews were undertaken by the first author who had undergone courses and scientific training with respect to the assessment instruments. Diagnoses and CHR status were systematically discussed with J.I.R. and P.M., both experienced psychiatrists and researchers. The EASE scores were discussed in detail with P.M., one of the authors of the EASE scale.
Results

The SPD Case
Robert is a 21-year-old student in information technology, who lives by himself in a student house. The last couple of years he had been lagging behind with his studies, attributing this to disturbances in thinking and attention. Further, he described marked feelings of unreality and detachment, and he was thinking that possibly some external force influenced and tormented him. He appeared attentive and organized in his speech during the interview, although contained. His demeanor seemed restricted, emotionally detached and a bit wary, but not unfriendly.
Feelings of unreality and detachment had been present since early childhood, with no obvious triggers, accompanied by marked feelings of distrust of others, and existential ruminations about the existence of others/the external world. His parents divorced when he was 3 years old, and he lived primarily with his mother during childhood. He described his mother as kind and caring. His father was also described as kind, but relations with him became distanced during adolescence. No marked childhood adversities were described, but he had few friends and he disliked school. Some attention and memory difficulties had been present through childhood, but he managed to get average to good degrees in school. During and following a difficult relationship with his first girlfriend at the age of 15-16 years, he developed more psychotic-like solipsistic ideas, as if he was the only real person alive, as well as ideas of external influence/control, although he was not fully convinced. Concurrently, his cognitive disturbances became more marked and depressive symptoms emerged. He had no history of drug abuse, but presently his consumption of alcohol was quite high and regular. He received short-term psychotherapy for depression and relational problems at the age of 16 and 20 years, with partial effect. At the age of 21 years, he revealed his psychotic-like ideas for the first time to a psychiatrist. After assessments at a specialized outpatient clinic, he was not considered psychotic, but was referred to the present study on CHR conditions. Before and during baseline assessments in the CHR study, he was treated with the antipsychotic quetiapin, 50 mg daily, a dose far below the lowest antipsychotic level.
The DPD Case
Eva is an 18-year-old high school student who presented with severe and persistent symptoms of depersonalization and derealization, as well as fluctuating, remitting symptoms of anxiety, and visual and auditive perceptual disturbances (e.g. colors and sounds seem different). Alongside these symptoms, she had been questioning the reality of self/others/world. She was attentive and engaged in the conversation with the interviewer, but her emotional and facial expressivity was decreased. Although reporting disturbances in thinking, this was not reflected in her speech.
Eva's parents divorced when she was 7 years old. After this incidence, she lived with her mother and 2 younger siblings. During childhood and adolescence, she often experienced her mother as moody, emotionally abusive, or neglectful. Her father was diagnosed with schizophrenia when she was a child. She visited him almost weekly, but experienced his irregular and odd behavior as a continuous burden. In spite of these adversities, she excelled at school and in sport activities, had many friends, and functioned well socially during childhood.
Present symptoms had a sudden onset 3 years ago, during an episode of second-time cannabis use in which she experienced a first-time panic attack. In the year preceding this episode, the relationship with her mother was more marked by arguments and conflict, she had been involved in some mild delinquent behavior, and she was more devoted to religious and metaphysical ideas than before. She had also been afflicted by migraines and cluster headaches during adolescence. Following the episode, she was referred to a child and adolescent outpatient unit, where she was diagnosed with an unspecified anxiety disorder. She was treated the next 2.5 years with psychotherapy and medication. Medication consisted of the antidepressant sertraline (50-100 mg daily, 28 months) and the antipsychotic risperidone (1-1.5 mg daily -sub-antipsychotic dose, 22 months). During the first year of treatment, symptoms remained strong, including global anxiety and several panic attacks, and she was not able to attend school. Then her symptoms gradually remitted, and she went back to school, although a stable depersonalized and emotionally numb state prevailed. She has never used cannabis or other illegal drugs again and has a low and sporadic consumption of alcohol. Symptoms recurred and increased 4-5 months after discharge, and she fell out of school once more. Then she was referred to a specialized outpatient clinic, where she again was treated with sertraline, 25 mg daily. Shortly after, she was referred to the present CHR study due to her feelings of unreality and perceptual disturbances.
As can be seen, both cases differed significantly with respect to medical history, childhood adversities, and childhood functioning. In the SPD case, ASEs had been present since early childhood, with no obvious triggers, while ASEs and anxiety symptoms commenced more abruptly in mid-adolescence in the DPD case, triggered by an episode of cannabis use. ASEs had a stable "all-daylong" character in both cases but in mid-adolescence gave rise to enduring psychotic-like symptoms, i.e., ideas about external influence/control in the SPD case, unlike the DPD case. While both cases reported longstanding emotional numbness after symptom onset, the DPD case reported more anxiety symptoms while the SPD case reported more depressive symptoms. In contrast to the SPD case, the DPD case reported emotional abuse and neglect during childhood and adolescence, and, strikingly, had a family history of schizophrenia. From early childhood on, the SPD case was described as withdrawn, emotionally detached, and distrustful with other people, with attention and memory difficulties, while the DPD case was described as high functioning socially and in school. Tables 1 and 2 present illustrating quotes on ASEs reflecting the two core dimensions of the BSD model (diminished self-affection and hyperreflexivity), the corresponding EASE items, and the EASE scores. The two cases presented many examples of EASE items from domain 1 Cognition and Stream of Consciousness and domain 2 Self-Awareness and Presence, reflecting the two core dimensions in both. However, the cases also differed with respect to which EASE items were present, and how they were presented. Unlike the DPD case, the SPD case displayed disturbances in self-, time, and world experience that seemed more entrenched and characterized by a more severe "externalization" (in this context meaning that aspects of the self, like thoughts or actions, seem to be influenced by or originate from some external, alien force [51] ), manifesting as a variety of paranoid, grandiose, and solipsistic "first-rank-like" ideas. Several of the quotes from the SPD case in Tables 1, 2 , and 3 illustrate these kinds of disturbances and attributions. Reflecting this attitude, the SPD case presented more items from domain 5 Existential Reorientation and only the SPD case presented an item in domain 4 Demarcation/Transitivism. In contrast to the SPD case, the DPD case described experiential anomalies marked by a strong feeling of a sudden change in self-experience ("My whole state of mind has changed completely, it's indescribably strange"; Table 2 ). This change was accompanied by an all-encompassing perplexity, exaggerated self-consciousness, and hyperreflexivity, but not by attributions to external forces. Although the SPD case also described anomalies in self-experience, these were not as extensively and spontaneously described as in the DPD case. They seemed more focused on disturbances in cognition and his indifferent mood. Only the DPD case endorsed EASE items from domain 3 Bodily Experiences, possibly reflecting this difference between the two cases. Table 3 illustrates experiences reflecting the depersonalization syndrome as well as corresponding EASE items. Both participants experienced symptoms from all the depersonalization symptom groups: feelings of disembodiment, emotional numbing, anomalous subjective recall, and derealization.
Discussion
The two core dimensions of the BSD model, as well as prototypical aspects of the depersonalization syndrome, were represented in both the SPD and the DPD case. The two cases differed, however, with respect to the tendency for "externalization" and delusional-like elaboration (stronger in SPD), as well as experienced perplexity and change in self-experience (stronger in DPD). Additionally, they differed with respect to timing and mode of onset, childhood adversities, family history of mental disorders, and childhood social and cognitive functioning.
Phenomenological Aspects and Differential Diagnostics
The presence of the core dimensions of BSD in both cases, including disturbances in the sense of mineness of experience, challenges the view that such disturbances are restricted to the schizophrenia spectrum, as asserted by Bürgy [39] . However, these results are in line with both historical and contemporary phenomenological analysis of chronic depersonalization and DPD. These studies describe these kinds of disturbances among the characteristic features of the depersonalization syndrome (using terms like "feelings of loss of agency" and "lack of body ownership feelings") [36] [37] [38] 52] .
With respect to the DPD case, these results are to a high degree in congruence with a recent study by Sass et al. [53] . This study examined the similarities between the descriptions of items in the EASE manual with those described in published accounts of severe depersonalization. In these accounts, examples of a match with the majority of EASE items were found (41 of the 57 items), including items mapping a diminishment in the sense of ownership and agency. The authors stated that depersonalization "represents the clearest non-schizophrenic (and non-psychotic) manifestation of diminished self-affection" (p. 432). Like our study (see quotes from the DPD case in Tables 1 and 2 ), these accounts also involved clear manifestations of hyperreflexivity. Even the quotes in Table 3 , illustrating aspects of the depersonalization syndrome, match the description of EASE items reflecting at least one of these dimensions: diminished self-affection. Thus, in both studies, complementarity between these BSD dimensions in non-schizophrenic conditions was demonstrated [53] . Given the overlap with the BSD dimensions, and the fact that depersonalization and derealization syndrome is mentioned among the criteria for schizotypal disorder in the diagnostic manual ICD-10 [41], it is not unexpected that also the SPD case presented with symptoms fitting with prototypical aspects of the depersonalization syndrome.
The empirical justification of the diagnosis of DPD has been criticized [54] , and it could be argued that the presence of BSD phenomena in chronic depersonalized states are to be expected, because patients diagnosed with DPD may in fact belong to the schizophrenia spectrum. However, the distinctiveness of DPD as a disorder with consistent clinical features (the symptoms constituting the depersonalization syndrome), which rarely develops into schizophrenia or other spectrum disorders, has been reinforced in recent years through large case studies and factor analysis, although prospective studies are still needed [33, 34, 36, 37, 55] .
Still, the striking similarities between our two cases on a phenomenological level seem to question the clear categorical separation of non-psychotic disorders like DPD from SSDs, like SPD. It is widely recognized and documented that mental disorders, symptoms, pathogenic factors, and psychopathological processes overlap, blend into each other, and are characterized by continuous dimensions [56] [57] [58] . In accordance with such a dimensional view, it has been suggested that depersonalization phenomena and ASEs may manifest in various degrees of severity on the same continuum, from the transient phenomena in the general population, via moderate variants in several non-psychotic conditions, to the most severe and stable forms found in schizophrenia [53] .
The description of symptoms in our two cases, as well as the results from the study by Sass et al. [53] , seems to fit well with this continuum model. We did not find clear examples in the DPD case of EASE items exhibiting what may be the most profound distortions of basic self-awareness, social identity, and self-world relationships, e.g., Sense of Change in Chronological Age (2.10), Confusion with the Other (4.1) or with Own Specular Image (4.2), Feelings of Centrality (5.2), and Solipsistic Grandiosity (5.7) (although she did entertain solipsistic feelings and thoughts about possibly being the only "real" person alive, related to the experience that other people looked Psychopathology DOI: 10.1159/000488462 "mechanical"). These are items possibly more pathognomonic for SSD conditions [53] , and several of them were also present in our SPD case (2.10, see Table 1 , 5.2, 5.7).
Fuchs [51] has presented a dimensional model of transition from basic and prodromal self-disorders and depersonalization phenomena to prototypical ego disorders (involving Schneider's first-rank symptoms) in schizophrenia, which may further illuminate both the affinities and the discrepancies between the two cases. The model involves four progressive stages: (1) alienation of operative intentionality, resulting from a lack of mineness or ipseity, (2) disintegration of the intentional arc, a rendering explicit and objectification of single elements, (3) externalization (attribution to external force), experienced in an "as if" mode, and (4) breakdown of the "as if" and transition to delusion [51] . Looking at the verbatim statements from the SPD case, he seems closer to this "breakdown of the as if" than the DPD case, considering the more severe externalization of symptoms (stage 3) and cognitive attributions of ASEs to external forces (stages 3 and 4). The DPD case presents with many examples of stages 1 and 2, and even some examples fitting with the description of stage 3, but the progression of symptoms seems to have halted at this stage.
We did also find some discrepancies between the findings in our study and the study by Sass et al. [53] . Our DPD case endorsed some EASE items assessed as not present in the study by Sass et al. [53] . This included items from domain 1: Thought Interference (1.1) ("I can't control it, I don't want to think about it, it pops up"), Silent Thought Echo (1.5) ("Something is played on and on again in my mind") and Disorder of Short-Term Memory (1.13) ("My memory is miserable, people notice it"), and domain 5: Magical Ideas (5.3) (see Table 1 , last quote). Possibly, this could be related to the fact that these items were specifically asked for during the EASE interview, contrary to the depersonalization accounts in the study by Sass et al. [53] , which did not involve use of the EASE. However, in light of a dimensional model, we may possibly posit our DPD case closer to a psychosis/schizophrenia pole than most DPD cases, considering her family history of schizophrenia and the cognitive disturbances reflected in the presence of EASE items from domain 1, including symptoms constituting the COGDIS criteria.
Psychopathological Pathways -Primary and Secondary BSD
The similarities and differences between the two cases with respect to phenomenological aspects may reflect similarities and differences in pathogenic factors and psychopathological processes. A recently updated model of self-disorders in schizophrenia, proposed by Sass and Borda [10] , may be enlightening in this respect [9] . They suggest that self-disorders are partly constituted by primary and partly by secondary factors or variants of BSD. Primary factors are hypothesized to reflect early childhood disturbances in neurodevelopment, which involve disruptions in sensorimotor functions and intermodal perceptual integration, including disturbances in somatosensory feedback [9, 59, 60] . Somatosensory feedback is assumed to be indispensable for the normal experience of feelings, existence, consciousness, and the self [61] . These disruptions may manifest in an automatic and pre-reflective form as a diminished feeling of unity and/ or ownership with respect to the body and mental life (i.e., as primary diminished self-presence/self-affection, operative (primary) hyperreflexivity, and primary disturbed "grip" of the world), and may impede the ability to apprehend the world in a holistic and vital fashion [9, 59] . It is possible that the early insidious onset in the SPD case reflects such primary forms of BSD, which may further have manifested as disturbances in social and cognitive functioning, as well as in personality development.
Secondary factors are also proposed to represent core dimensions of BSD (secondary forms of diminished selfpresence/self-affection, [reflective] hyperreflexivity, and disturbed "grip" of the world), but these are considered as a kind of defensive-compensatory reactions to primary factors and other stressors, e.g., interpersonal strain, demands, or trauma. These secondary factors may occur early in the life course, too, but they are likely to get more pronounced during adolescence and early adulthood, probably affected by the rapid neurocognitive development of the prefrontal lobes in adolescence [10] . Secondary factors may also be associated with disturbances in the activation of the default mode network. Psychologically, these disturbances may imply withdrawal from the external world and concomitant hyperreflexive awareness of "inner" experiences [10, 62] .
According to Sass and Borda [10] , ASEs in DPD correspond closely to those in schizophrenia, but are only secondary and defensive in nature. Childhood and adolescent adversities and trauma are common both in schizophrenia and in SPD, and may contribute to secondary ASEs/forms of BSD, both in SSD and in DPD [63] [64] [65] . This model is intriguing because it offers a transdiagnostic perspective on the psychopathological role of internal and external stressors in generating ASEs. The abrupt onset of ASEs in our DPD case may have a secondary nature possibly related to both present stressors (the cannabis episode as well as prevailing conflicts in the family?) and childhood adversities (emotional neglect and abuse, in line with other studies on childhood trauma in DPD [35] ).
The differences in the type and timing of onset of ASEs may additionally be an explanation for the difference between the two cases with respect to experiences of perplexity. In the DPD case, a sudden, extreme transformation of her experiential world took place 3 years ago. The sudden, "de novo" mode of onset triggered by cannabis, commonly associated with a terrifying, "bad-trip" experience, is a clinical pattern repeatedly found in DPD [33, 34, [66] [67] [68] . The onset of symptoms in the DPD case was followed by strong, enduring feelings of unreality and perplexity marking her depersonalized state. In the SPD case, however, the insidious childhood onset and his longprevailing depersonalized state turned the strangeness of the world into the new "normality" of his childhood and adolescence life. Hence, the experiences of perplexity probably became less pronounced even though still present [62] .
Interestingly, in parallel with the suggested neurobiological substrate of BSD in schizophrenia [59] , the neurobiology of depersonalization and derealization also seems to be characterized by disturbances in perceptual integration. These disturbances are proposed to involve hyperactive prefrontal inhibitory mechanisms suppressing activity in emotional-related areas like the amygdala, insula, and other limbic-related structures. These inhibitory processes result in reduced autonomic responses to emotionally salient stimuli, reduced somatosensory feedback, and deficiencies in interoception. This probably manifests as emotional numbness and qualitative changes in the experience of self, including unreality and detachment feelings [69] [70] [71] . Disturbances in multisensory integration in DPD may also involve certain parietal networks considered important for feelings of embodiment, body ownership, and agency [38] .
Although disruptions in perceptual integration may explain feelings of unreality and detachment in both SSD and DPD, some of the psychopathological pathways and underlying neurobiological processes may still differ. While these disruptions may reflect primary disturbances in early neurodevelopment in schizophrenia, they are suggested as neurobiological responses for dealing with stress and anxiety ("defensive" processes) in DPD [70] , usually occurring at a later stage in life. Accordingly, disruptions in multisensory integration in schizophrenia may be more severe and encompassing than in DPD, involving early structural alterations which we may not find in DPD. Although DPD patients often present with subtle subjective impairments in short-term memory, recall, imagery, and attention [72, 73] , they do not in general demonstrate the more severe cognitive disturbances centering on cingulate and prefrontal functioning more typical for schizophrenia [74, 75] .
According to Sass and Borda [10] , secondary factors constitute a "second hit" important for the development of full-blown schizophrenia. Primary factors are suggested to have adverse effects on the formation of a core or basic self, rendering this fragile self as particularly vulnerable when "hit" by secondary factors. In prodromal states, this may involve a progressive psychopathological process finally ending in psychotic "first-rank" symptoms [16, 51] . Looking at our DPD case, the investigation of childhood functioning did not reveal any signs of being compromised by primary BSD. Thus, she may have been well protected with respect to a psychotic decompensation after the onset of ASEs. Possibly, the increased prefrontal inhibitory activity considered characteristic for depersonalized conditions may have acted as a protective buffer as well. Still, her family history of schizophrenia, as well as the presence of cognitive disturbances (reflected in fulfilling COGDIS criteria), may indicate that she could be at a higher risk of psychosis than the majority of DPD patients.
Considering the SPD case, primary factors may have been prominent, but a combination of primary and secondary factors may still lie behind the present clinical picture. He describes a worsening in his symptoms around the age of 15-16 years, which could be the effect of secondary factors deriving from primary factors (e.g., manifesting as prototypical schizotypal trait disturbances in interpersonal functioning), combined with life stressors like a troublesome relationship with his first girlfriend. However, a full psychotic decompensation has not followed, in his case possibly also due to neurocognitive protective mechanisms. It has been found that many SPD patients do not display the frontal lobe reductions observed in schizophrenia, possibly protecting them from full-blown psychosis [76] .
Conclusions
This phenomenological investigation demonstrates striking similarities in the presence of ASEs between a SPD case and a DPD case, reflecting the two core BSD dimensions and the four prototypical aspects of the depersonalization syndrome. Differences between the two Psychopathology DOI: 10.1159/000488462 cases, particularly with respect to the mode of onset and cognitive elaborations/attributions of ASEs, may reflect the predominance of primary (most prominent in the SPD case) versus secondary forms of BSD (most prominent in the DPD case). Closely considering psychopathology, social and medical history in light of this updated BSD model, may enhance the specificity of ASEs as phenotypic markers of vulnerability for SSDs and psychosis.
Even though experiencing what appear to be many similar kinds of ASEs, DPD patients may normally be better protected against psychosis, as their neurodevelopment might be less or not compromised by early dysregulation/ primary factors. This is to our knowledge the first empirical case study comparing assessments of ASEs based on EASE interviews in a DPD patient and a SPD patient. The phenomenological investigation of two cases allows thorough, detailed, and diverse scrutiny, but evidently limits the generalizability. Although the DPD case presented with a typical clinical picture with respect to symptoms and medical history, she is still possibly somewhat atypical considering her family history of schizophrenia and cognitive disturbances, with repercussions for the generalizability of the results. However, considering a dimensional perspective on BSD and depersonalization, she is an interesting and illustrating case. This study creates a rationale for new hypotheses and further research in this field, which should recruit larger samples of non-psychotic depersonalized conditions, and compare with SSD or CHR samples, based on the use of EASE and other appropriate measures.
